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THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE: A CLARIFICATION
JOHN E. MURRAY, JR.*
One of the paradoxes of American law review writing at its present
stage of development is the concern which contributors demonstrate for
esoteric matters when fundamental areas remain to be further explored
or clarified. While an occasional article dealing with a so-called elemen-
tary area is published, most law review writing considers narrow areas
where controversy rages or is started by the writing. There is a great
need for legal scholarship in the narrow areas, but this modest piece is
dedicated to the function of clarification. It is a response to this writer's
observation of the fog or mystery' which surrounds that nexus of ideas
grouped under the title, "The Parol Evidence Rule."2 There are few,
if any, new ideas here, but it is hoped that the attempt to expose con-
cisely the quintessence of the subject will aid many students, some law-
yers, and perhaps a few judges.
When the parties to a contract embody the terms of their agreement
in a writing, intending that writing to be the final expression of their
agreement, the terms of the writing may not be contradicted by evidence
of any prior agreement.' This is a statement of the parol evidence rule.
The first thought that should occur to any lawman is that the rule can
be described easily. However, the description of any legal concept usually
succeeds in doing little more than creating an illusion of certainty. To
* B.S., 1955, LaSalle College; LL.B., 1958, Catholic University of America; S.J.D., 1959,
University of Wisconsin. Member of the Wisconsin Bar. Professor of Law, Duquesne
University.
1. No article in this area would be complete without a reference to the statement of
JAxES BRADLEY THAYER, TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 390 (1898): "Few
things are darker than this, or fuller of subtle difficulties."
2. Many of the thoughts suggested herein are elaborations of GRISMoRE, CONTRACTS
§ 94 (Murray rev. ed. 1965). For a comprehensive treatment of the subject, see MCCoRMIcX,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, ch. 24 (1954). See also, 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTs §§ 573-
596 (2d ed. 1960).
3. For a modem statement of the rule see UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-202. It
should be noted that any statement of the rule in this article avoids the use of the Word
"contemporaneous" on the theory that the alleged extrinsic element is either prior to or
subsequent to the writing and that "contemporaneous" merely clouds the issue. There is no
mention of the problem of "partial integration" in the article. For a discussion of this
subject, see CoRmx, op. cit. supra note 2, at § 581.
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understand the parol evidence rule, the purpose of the rule must be ascer-
tained.
If the parties to a transaction express agreement and subsequently
express another agreement, intending the subsequent agreement to prevail
over their antecedent expression, their final expression will prevail. This
is not a statement of the parol evidence rule. It is a much broader state-
ment because it would be correct in any of the following situations:
(a) Both expressions of agreement are oral;
(b) the first expression is written and the second is oral;
(c) both expressions are written;
(d) the first expression is oral and the second is written.
The machinery of the parol evidence rule may become operative only
in situations (c) and (d). If the subsequent agreement is evidenced by a
writing, the rule may become operative, whether the prior agreement was
oral or written. If one of the parties alleges that the subsequent written
agreement was intended to be the final and complete expression of the
parties' agreement, thereby discharging any prior agreement, the parol
evidence machinery is activated. It now becomes necessary to decide a
question of fact-did the parties intend the subsequent written agreement
to be their final and complete or "integrated" expression, or, did they
intend any prior agreements (oral or written) to be part of their total
agreement with the written manifestation? It matters not how this ques-
tion of fact is decided. Whatever the decision, the parol evidence rule has
been invoked. It is important to recognize that this is the only situation
in which the rule is invoked. If the parties disagree as to what their mani-
festations of intent mean, the parol evidence rule will not solve the prob-
lem. If one of the parties alleges that the writing does not state the true
intention of the parties, the remedy of reformation may or may not be
granted, but; once again, the parol evidence rule is not involved.
Why has this relatively simple matter, the determination of intention
(a question of fact), taken on an air of mystery? In the first and second
situations, supra, (a) and (b), if the question was whether the parties
intended the second expression to prevail over the first, the question would
be determined in the usual fashion in attempting to ascertain the total
agreement. However, when the second expression is written, this same
question invokes the parol evidence machinery. When the prior expression
is oral and the second is in writing, courts have traditionally followed a
policy of affording special protection to the writing. They early recognized
that a jury may fail to adequately consider the relative unreliability of
the prior oral expression. The writing is unchanged at the time of trial,
but the oral expression may be the subject of the favorable (conscious or
unconscious) recollection of the party who is urging that the writing is
not final and complete. Because of this lack of sophistication in juries in
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choosing between the competing manifestations of agreement, courts did
not wish to trust juries with the question. Thus, this question of fact was
reserved to the courts. The experience of judges could be trusted in this
matter. Yet, this meant an invasion of the traditional province of the jury,
to wit, a question of fact would now be decided by the court. The courts
were unwilling to clearly indicate what they were doing. Thus, they
cloaked their fact-finding with "rules" which sounded very much like
rules of evidence.
The shibboleths which are often called statements of the parol evidence
rule began. The usual statement was that parol evidence is not admissible
to "contradict or vary the terms of the writing."' 4 Unfortunately, few
wondered, why not? Suppose the writing did not state the true intention
of the parties? Suppose the parties intended their agreement to include a
prior expression even though it contradicted, varied or added to the terms
of the agreement as manifested by the writing? The popular statement of
the rule succeeded in preserving the question of fact for the court, but it
also succeeded in masking the real problems. This led to confusion on
the part of the courts themselves who were too often content to repeat
the mistakes as well as the wisdom of the past. Another favorite statement
of the rule was that when the parties executed a writing, it was conclu-
sively presumed to contain the entire agreement.' Once again, this result
should only follow if the parties intended the writing to be complete and
final. The language of "conclusive presumption," however, tended to fur-
ther bury and confuse the essential problems. Still other statements,
though beginning to focus upon the real question, were expressed in the
form of a conclusion. Thus, the question was asked, was the writing
"integrated"? 6 If it was, no prior expressions of agreement would be ad-
mitted. If not, such expressions could be considered as part of the total
agreement. This statement, however, tended to obscure the difficult ques-
tion, how does the trial judge determine whether the writing is integrated?
If the writing is integrated, this means that the parties intended it to be
the final and complete statement of their agreement. The essential ques-
tion of fact-the intention of the parties-remained. A corollary of this
statement was another expression of conclusion which continues to thrive
in the cases. The question would be asked, was the prior agreement "col-
lateral" to the writing?7 The only way in which this question could be
answered was to, once again, determine whether the parties intended the
subsequent writing to be the final and complete or "integrated" statement
of their agreement. If that question is answered no, it would be proper
4. A recent illustration of the use of this phraseology is found in Bruce v. Blalock,
241 S.C. 155, 127 S.E.2d 439, 442 (1962).
5. See Seitz v. Brewers' Refrigerating Mach. Co., 141 U.S. 510, 517 (1891).
6. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 228 (1932).
7. See MitchilU v. Lath, 247 N.Y. 377, 160 N.E. 646 (1928) in which the court considered
this as one of the inquiries.
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to characterize the prior expression as "collateral" and thereby admit
evidence of it. None of these statements assisted the trial judge who still
found himself confronted with the question of fact. Even characterizing
the question as one of law' (because the trial judge decided it) was of
no help to the judge. Learned writers in the fields of contracts and evi-
dence were harping on what quickly became a favorite theme: the so-
called parol evidence rule is not a rule of evidence; it is a rule of sub-
stantive law.' In focusing upon this matter, the writers were soThewhat
remiss in failing to suggest effective guides for the trial judge, who con-
tinued to face the question of the parties' intention in any case in which
the rule was invoked. However, two of the writers suggested formulae
for the trial judge which have been repeated in many opinions.
Dean Wigmore suggests an aid, not a conclusive test. He directs the
trial judge to determine the question of intent by considering whether
the lalleged extrinsic negotiation is dealt with at all in the writing. If it is
mentioned at all, presumably the writing was intended to embody that
element of the negotiation and, therefore, the prior expression is ex-
cluded.'" Professor Williston's more flexible suggestion smacks of the
"reasonable man" test. He asks the trial court to determine the inherent
probability that parties, situated as were the parties involved, would or
might generally enter into the written agreement and also the alleged parol
agreement."
One of the landmark cases dealing with the parol evidence rule indicates
some of the confusion which appellate courts find in dealing with the
essential question. In Gianni v. Russel, 2 the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania, in an opinion by Justice Schaffer, quotes the Wigmore "aid."'
However, earlier in the opinion the question is posed, "When does the
oral agreement come within the field embraced by the written one?" The
question is answered in language which can hardly be distinguished from
the Williston test: "[Would] parties, situated as were the ones to the
contract,... naturally and normally include the one in the other if it
were made."?' 4 There is no citation to the Williston treatise at this point
in the opinion. Arguably, the same result is appropriate under the facts
in the case whether either test is used. However, the perhaps unconscious
interchangeable use of the tests fails to consider the possible difference
in result under other facts. In addition, there are recent indications that
8. See Walker v. Saricks, 360 Pa. 594, 63 A.2d 9, 11 (1949).
9. See CoRBn, op. cit. supra note 2, at § 573; WiGmoRE, EvmENCE § 2400 (3d ed.
1940); 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 631 (3d ed. 1961).
10. WiUwORE, op. cit. supra note 9, at § 2430.
11. WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 9, at § 638.
12. 281 Pa. 320, 126 Ad. 791 (1924).
13. Id. at 324.
14. Id. at 323-24.
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some contracts specialists are unaware that both tests were stated in
Gianni.15
A hard fact which the trial judge must often face in parol evidence cases
is not considered by either test. The tests are predicated on the assumption
that a prior expression of agreement really exists. Often a party urges the
writing not as the final and complete statement of the parties' agreement;
but as the only statement of agreement. Neither test attempts to cope with
the situation where the trial judge simply does not believe that the prior
expression ever existed. Dean Wigmore clearly did not intend the trial
judge to decide the question of existence1 6 and, presumably, neither did
Professor Williston.17 However, there is a strong argument that the pur-
pose of the parol evidence rule is best served when the trial judge can
preclude the admission of prior expressions of agreement which he con-
siders to be clearly fabricated.
Other tests have been suggested. The most obvious one is to allow the
question of fact involved to be treated as are all such questions. This can
be translated into the suggestion that the rule be emasculated. It would
seem desirable only if there is no need to preserve the integrity of written
contracts by affording them special protection when they compete with
prior expressions of agreement. It is submitted that there should be special
protection afforded writings in this situation. As to the trial judge's
dilemma, perhaps a combination of the Wigmore, Williston and other
tests should be used. The primary purpose of this article is clarification
rather than the urging of a new test. Yet, the temptation to suggest a
remedy will not down. One of the other tests not yet mentioned herein is
that the writing be presumed to contain all of the terms of the agreement.
This presumption could be overcome by clear and convincing proof to
the contrary.'" If the writing or writings (there may be more than one)
seem to be complete, the "combination" remedy suggested here would be
15. In a recent edition of a well-known casebook in Contracts, one of the editors,
Professor Farnsworth, indicates that Wigmore's test is stated in the Gianni case. Apparently,
he feels that the Williston test is not stated. JoNEs, FARNSWORTH AND YOUNG, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS (1965).
16. At 9 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 2430, the author states: "If he [the judge] decides that
the transaction was covered by the writing, he does not decide that the excluded negotiations
did take place, but merely if they did take place they are nevertheless legally immaterial.
If he decides that the transaction was not intended to be covered by the writing, he does
not decide that the negotiations did take place, but merely if they did, they are legally
effective, and he then leaves to the jury the determination of fact whether they did take
place."
17. At 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 638, the author states, "The point is not merely
whether the court is convinced that the parties before it did in fact do this, but whether
parties so situated generally would or might do so."
18. See Hale, The Parol Evidence Rule, 4 ORE. L. REv. 91 (1925) and Bressler and
Taylor, A Critique of the Parol Evidence Rule in Pennsylvania, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 703, 721
(1952).
1965-1966]
DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
to presume that the writing is complete. This presumption could be over-
come. The trial judge could determine whether it is overcome by con-
sidering whether the alleged extrinsic element has been dealt with at all
in the writing (Wigmore), and by considering whether parties, situated
as were the parties to the contract, would naturally and normally include
the extrinsic matter in the writing (Williston). Whatever his decision on
the question of the parties' intent as to the finality and completeness of
the writing, the trial judge would not determine the question of the exis-
tence of the alleged extrinsic negotiation. This separate question of fact
would be for the jury.
If the parol evidence rule is based upon distrust of juries because they
lack sophistication in comparing an oral expression with a subsequent
writing, why should the rule apply when both expressions are written?
Does the rule afford special protection to a subsequent writing even though
such writing is competing with a prior writing? The usual statement of
the rule excludes proof of prior oral or written expressions of agreement.
Yet, it would seem to lose much of its force if the prior expression is writ-
ten. The prior writing is not unchanged at the time of trial any more than
the subsequent writing. Perhaps the rule should not be invoked at all in
this situation, or, if invoked, it should not operate in the same way it does
when the prior expression is oral. Returning to the four situations set
forth near the beginning of this piece, the writers who have emphasized
the substantive aspect of the rule have made it clear that in any of those
situations, the parties' intention will control. Professor Corbin is correct
when he states, "No contract, whether oral or written, can be varied,
contradicted or discharged by an antecedent agreement. Today may con-
trol the effect of what happened yesterday; but yesterday cannot change
the effect of what happens today."19 Once again, however, this is not a
statement of the parol evidence rule. It would apply in any of the four
situations, whereas the rule applies only in situations (c) and (d), where
the subsequent expression is written. The basis for the rule as set forth
in this piece seems clearly applicable only in situation (d) (prior oral
expression). If the question is put, if the parties intend, should not the
.subsequent writing prevail even though the prior expression is written,
the answer must be, yes. But the answer is yes for the same reason that
the answer would be yes to a similar question in relation to situations
(a) and (b) where the subsequent expression is oral. This points up the
failure to clearly identify the purpose of the rule. The rule exists to afford
special protection to subsequent written expressions of agreement when
the parties intend such expressions to be complete and final. Whether the
parties intended this result in a particular case is a question of fact which
is decided by the trial judge (according to one or more guides) because
juries cannot be trusted to accord proper weight to the writing over prior
oral expressions. Stating the purpose and operation of the rule in this
19. 3 CoR.BiN, CoNmT.cTs § 574.
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fashion, it is difficult to clearly apply it when the prior expression is writ-
ten. If juries would not accord proper weight to a final writing over a prior
writing, perhaps the reason for the rule remains even where both expres-
sions are written. Otherwise, the question of fact involved should be
decided as are other questions of fact.
When the parol evidence rule is thus analyzed, most of the confusion
surrounding it disappears. Any remaining mystery is attributable to inci-
dental causes. One of the obvious incidental causes is the misnomer by
which the rule is known. While it has just been suggested that the rule
should, perhaps, not apply or, at least, should be applied differently where
the prior expression is written, at present it applies whether the prior
expression is oral or written. Thus, the anomalous term; "parol," is used
to mean either an oral or written expression. Because judges, in reserving
a question of fact to themselves couched the process in rules which
sounded like rules of evidence, the term "evidence" is part of the title
of the rule which only serves to add to the mystery surrounding it.
Another significant cause of confusion is the failure to distinguish be-
tween the parol evidence rule on the one hand, and interpretation on the
other. The parol evidence machinery will determine only one question:
whether the parties intended their final writing to be integrated. No matter
how this question is decided, the meaning of the writing does not auto-
matically become unambiguous. The confusion of the rule with the process
of interpretation is traceable to a period when courts were inclined to deal
with written words as if they had a clear meaning apart from any partic-
ular usage and when men were held to that meaning regardless of how far
it may have differed from their known intent. Fortunately, progress has
been made in this area. "The history of the law of interpretation is the
history of a progress from a stiff and superstitious formalism to a flexible
rationalism."20 What remains of the earlier point of view is often expressed
in the supposed rule that you cannot depart from "the strict, plain, com-
mon meaning of the words themselves."'" One of the best responses to this
notion was recently stated by Professor Corbin:
It is sometimes said, in a case in which the written words seem
plain and clear and unambiguous, that the words are not subject
to interpretation or construction. One who makes this statement
has of necessity already given the words an interpretation-the
one that is to him plain and clear; and in making the statement
he is asserting that any different interpretation is "perverted"
and untrue.22
Still another incidental cause of confusion concerns alleged "exceptions"
to the rule. For example, it is said that parol evidence is admissible to
20. 9 WIr, oRE, EviDExcE § 2461.
21. See Tindal, C. J., in Attorney-General v. Shore, 11 Sim. 592, 615 (1833-34).
22. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 CoNELL L.Q.
161, 171-72 (1965).
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show that a contract was never formed. It cannot be gainsaid that evidence
is admissible for this purpose, but this is not an exception to the rule.
Before any question of admitting evidence of prior expressions which
vary, contradict or alter the writing can arise, there must be an enforce-
able agreement to vary, contradict or alter. Along the same lines, parol
evidence is admissible to show the unenforceability of the contract on
grounds of fraud, mistake, duress, illegality, etc. Once again, this is not
an exception to the rule. Finally, parol evidence is admissible in a suit in
equity to reform the writing to state the true intention of the parties.23
The same parol evidence could run afoul of the rule in an action on the
contract, but reformation is a remedy whereby the writing is allegedly
mistaken and the plaintiff seeks to have it reformed to state the true
intention. If the parol evidence rule is understood, it is clear that it should
have no effect on the remedy of reformation.
The criticism of the rule over the years has gone to the confusion sur-
rounding it. While much has been written to penetrate to the underlying
purpose and operation of the rule, there has been a tendency on the part
of many explorers in this area to arrive at one unalterable truth concern-
ing it. Focusing upon that truth, the typical expos6 would tend to suggest
it as the panacea of understanding the rule. If there is one truth which
this article has focused upon above all others, it is that too little attention
has been paid to the process which the trial judge undergoes in deciding
that essential question of intention which is involved in every parol evi-
dence case. It is fair to say that at least one writer has suggested the
alternative guides which are available to the courts. 4 This article has
merely combined some of the guides to suggest that the trial judge should
have some leeway in deciding this question. It is now for the courts to
begin to understand the rule and that understanding must start with a
frank recognition that the question to be decided is one of fact.
The success or failure of this piece can be tested by how well the reader
understands the following statement of the parol evidence rule: the rule
seeks to afford special protection to writings which the parties intend to
be the final and complete expression of their agreement over prior expres-
sions of agreement. This is accomplished by entrusting the trial judge to
decide whether the parties had such an intention. The judge decides this
question of fact with the help of one or more common sense guides. The
parol evidence machinery is activated only in this situation. If the parties
did intend their writing to be integrated, substantive contract law would
insist that their intention be realized. But this would be true if the parol
evidence rule never existed. It is the intrusion of the trial judge on the
traditional province of the jury which is the parol evidence rule in action.
23. See General Discount Corporation v. Sadowski, 183 F.2d 542 (6th Cir. 1950).
24. McCoR.mICK,oP. cit. supra note 2.
